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Recent Decisions
SALES - EFFECT OF THE OHIO CERTIFICATE OF MOTOR VEHICLE
TITLE LAW ON THE BONA FIDE PURCHASER DOCTRINE
Mutual Finance Company v. Municipal Employees Union Local
No. 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341, 165 N.E.2d 435 (1960)
Plaintiff, Mutual Finance Company, had obtained a "floor plan mort-
gage"'1 covering four new Chrysler automobiles from N. J. Popovic, a
franchised dealer of the Chrysler Corporation. Under the floor plan ar-
rangement, Mutual paid Chrysler Corporation for the four new autos de-
livered to Popovic. Mutual retained a note and chattel mortgage along
with the manufacturer's statements of origin2 covering the four vehicles.
Popovic sold the automobiles to the defendants, who had no notice of
the prior liens on the purchased autos. Defendants had traded in their
used cars as part payment and had financed the remainder of the purchase
price through Mutual. Mutual retained chattel mortgages as security for
its loan to defendants. This transaction gave Mutual a second lien on the
same four automobiles. Mutual then honored a draft drawn upon itself
by Popovic in the amount of the retail loans and sent that amount to
Popovic rather than applying this amount toward satisfaction of the floor
plan mortgage covering the same autos. Upon default of payment by
Popovic under the floor plan mortgage,3 plaintiff instituted an action of
replevin to regain possession of the four vehicles from the defendants.
Plaintiff based its right to possession of the cars on the Certificate of
Title Law which states that continued possession of a mortgage along with
the certificate of origin of an automobile creates a valid lien as against
subsequent purchasers.4 Defendant's cross petition sought an order com-
pelling Mutual to assign the manufacturer's statements of origin of the
vehicles to the defendants, Municipal Employees Union, Local No. 1099.
The basis for defendant's demand was that the plaintiff was estopped
from denying the dealer's ability to pass good title to a bona fide purchaser
1. A "floor plan mortgage" is the buying and mortgaging of automobiles by a finance com-
pany which then allows them to be placed on the floor of a dealer so that the dealer may sell
them in the ordinary course of his business.
2. Manufacturers' statements of origin are those manufacturers' certificates which accompany
the delivery of any new automobiles to the dealer. They contain certain identification mark-
ings of the auto.
3. The mortgage agreement provided that the mortgagor was to be in default when after
selling one of the mortgaged autos he failed to pay off the mortgage on that particular auto
from the proceeds of the sale.
4. OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.13.
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when the plaintiff knowingly allowed the dealer to display the vehicles
for sale in the ordinary course of the dealer's retail business.5
The trial court denied plaintiff's request and granted to the defendants
the relief prayed for in the cross petition.' Its decision was based in the
first instance on the grounds of "floor plan estoppel" as set forth by the
defendant. Secondly, the court held that Mutual, in financing the retail
purchases of the autos upon which it had prior floor plan mortgages, had
extinguished its floor plan mortgage on the autos. Since Popovic was
obligated to pay off the floor plan mortgage with the proceeds from the
sale of the autos which were "floor planned," Mutual, in granting the
retail loans to the defendants, should have applied the amounts of those
loans in satisfaction of the floor plan mortgage.7 From this ruling the
plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial court had erred in not recog-
nizing that the Act had abolished the equitable defense of "floor plan
estoppel." It was argued that according to the terms of the Act owner-
ship was made to depend solely on the certificate of tide.
To understand plaintiff's position some discussion of the mechanics
of the Act must be given. The Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law
represents a radical change in the registration of liens on new vehicles.8
The new Act provides for the registration of liens directly on the auto-
mobile certificate of title, in lieu of the filing of mortgages in the office of
the county recorder.9  A chattel mortgage covering a new motor vehicle
is effective if such mortgage
is accompanied by delivery of a manufacturer's or importer's certificate
and followed by actual and continued possession of such certificate by
the holder of said instrument.'0
Such a mortgage is valid against subsequent purchasers." The Act in
this respect places the burden upon one acquiring a chattel mortgage on
an automobile, prior to its initial sale to a retail purchaser, to obtain the
manufacturer's certificate of origin of said vehicle and maintain continued
possession of such certificate. It must also be kept in mind that a pur-
chaser obtains a title certificate to a new automobile indirectly in that
the dealer is required to obtain it in the name of the purchaser upon
5. This is an application of the "floor plan estoppel doctrine." See National Guar. & Fin.
Co. v. Ptaff Motor Car Co., 124 Ohio St. 34, 176 N.E. 678 (1931); 9 OHio Ju. 2d Chattel
Mortgages § 112 (1954).
6. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Meade, 161 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio C.P. 1959). This opinion represents
the decision in seven separate actions involving the same legal issue.
7. Id. at 565.
8. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local No. 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341,
350, 165 N.E2d 435, 442 (1960). See also, Union Commercial Corp. v. R. J. Schmunk Co.,
30 Ohio LAbs. 116 (Ct. App. 1939).
9. OHno Rnv. CODE § 4505.14.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
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presentment of the manufacturer's certificate of origin.'2 This places the
burden upon the purchaser to make certain that the dealer has the manu-
facturer's statement of origin to the vehicle he has purchased. This prac-
tice becomes extremely important because the Certificate of Motor Ve-
hiclde Title Law does not allow one to obtain any "right, title or interest"
in a vehicle without possession of the certificate of tide. 3  It forbids any
court in law or equity to recognize title in one who does not possess the
certificate of title. 4 Nor can any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of
one not possessing the certificate of title or manufacturer's statement of
origin.'5 This provision indicates that the legislature anticipated a situa-
tion in which a vehicle would get ahead of its title. Prior Ohio court de-
cisions have given a literal interpretation to the Act, especially the pro-
vision which recognizes the validity of a prior lien as against subsequent
purchasers.' 6
The court of appeals agreed with plaintiff's contention that the Cer-
tificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law did away with the "floor plan estoppel"
doctrine.'" But the court then went on to affirm the trial court's decision
on the equitable grounds that, as between two innocent parties, the first
to trust the wrongdoer and give the means for committing fraud must
bear the loss. Accordingly, Mutual, which was the first to trust Popovic
and give him the means to commit fraud on the defendants, was made
to bear the loss. Mutual's floor plan mortgage was, in effect, nullified
by the court.'" In attempting to further support this decision the court
observed that Mutual's method of policing the automobiles had been
faulty, and that with due diligence it could have averted the entire situa-
tion. The court in thus nullifying the lien on equitable grounds failed to
give a literal interpretation to the Act.
The propriety of the court's application of the equitable doctrine is
doubtful for two reasons. First, the cases cited by the court to uphold
its application of the equity theory are cases in which the two innocent
parties concerned had equal legal rights.'9 In the case under considera-
12. OHIo REV. CODE § 4505.06. Under this section a dealer is required to obtain a certifi-
cate of title in behalf of the purchaser within three days after the sale of the automobile.
13. OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.04. This section repealed the Bill of Sale Law, Ohio Gen. Code
§§ 6310-3 to -14, which provided that a receipt of bill of sale from a dealer was evidence of
title to an automobile.
14. OHIO REV. CODE § 4505.04.
15. Ibid. Associates Inv. Co. v. Le Boutillier, 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N.E.2d 1011 (1941).
16. Associates Inv. Co. v. Le Boutillier, 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N.E.2d 1011 (1941); Craw-
ford Fin. Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306 (1939).
17. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Municipal Employees Union Local No. 1099, 110 Ohio App. 341,
353, 165 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1960).
18. Ibid.
19. A number of cases were cited by the court in support of this proposition. Among them
were: McHenry v. Old Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 85 Ohio St. 203, 97 N.E. 395 (1911); Wilson
v. Hicks, 40 Ohio St. 418 (1884); Selser v. Brock, 3 Ohio St. 302 (1854).
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tion Mutual Finance Company had a chattel mortgage created in accord-
ance with the provisions of the applicable statute. On the other hand, the
defendants had no legal right to the automobiles since the statute pre-
dudes any party from gaining any "right, title or interest" in a vehicle
unless he has obtained a certificate of title.2" Secondly, the equity theory
is in the nature of an estoppel which the statute specifically forbids being
applied in favor of one who does not possess the certificate of title.2' The
court of appeal's decision thus goes counter to the express mandate of the
Ohio legislature.
It is possible that the same result could have been achieved without
such conflict. The trial court found that Mutual extinguished its floor
plan or wholesale mortgage lien when it financed the purchase of the
same autos which were the subject of its floor plan mortgage m Popovic
was to pay off the floor plan mortgages with the proceeds from the sale
of the autos. When the purchasers borrowed money from Mutual to
purchase these same autos, Mutual had in its possession the necessary
amount of money to satisfy its prior lien. Having been in possession of
the necessary amount of money from the source which was to supply such
money to extinguish the lien, Mutual must be deemed to have extin-
guished its floor plan mortgage (even though, in fact, Mutual had given
the amount of the retail loan to Popovic expecting Popovic to pay it back
to Mutual).
The court of appeals in arriving at an equitable result set itself against
the plain meaning of the Ohio Certificate of Motor Vehicle Title Law.
Difficult as such cases are, it should be left to the legislature to amend
the act to prevent inequitable results such as would have occurred here
had the court given a literal reading to the statute. Other states have
averted this problem by enacting special statutes which protect the bona
fide purchaser from unknown liens on vehicles in a dealer's possession.'
20. Omo Rnv. CoDE § 4505.13. For example in Milke v. Leeberson, 150 Oio St. 528,
83 N.E.2d 209 (1948), the Ohio Supreme Court said it was upon the plaintiff to prove he
had the title certificate to the vehicle he was driving in order for him to establish ownership
and recover for damages to the vehicle. In Gailich v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113
N.E.2d 92 (1953), the Ohio Supreme Court again gave a literal interpretation to the Certifi-
cate of Motor Vehicle Title Law by decidiog that although defendant had sold his auto and
no longer retained possession of it, the fact that he retained the certificate of title to the auto
was conclusive as to whether defendant's insurance policy on said auto was still in effect.
Through possession of the title certificate, defendant, in the eyes of the law, was the owner
of the vehicle. See also, In re Estate of Case, 161 Ohio St. 288, 118 N.F.2d 836 (1954);
Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951); Fredericks v. Birkett L.
Williams Co., 68 Ohio App. 217, 40 N.E.2d 162 (1940).
21. OHIo REv. CODE § 4505.04.
22. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Meade, 161 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230-2 (1922); Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.480 (1949).
See also, Note, The Effect of Motor Registration Statutes on Security Transactions and Recor-
dations, [1951] WAsH. U.LQ. 539, 540.
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